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BASTAJIAN V. BROWN.

[19 O. (2d)

dicial error. There an order denying a motion for a new
trial was vacated on the ground that the judge had misinterpreted a waiver filed .in connection with the motion, he
believing that the waiver was of any error with respect to
certain jury instructions. In its order vacating its order of
denial the court recited that the latter order was inadvertent
"by reason of such neglect, oversight, accident and mistake
in the reading of the waiver and conclusion as to its effect."
Obviously the court's error in its conclusion as to the effect of the waiver or its error in the interpretation thereof
was judicial. I t exercised its judgment on the issue of how
the waiver should be construed and its legal effect. But
where the judgment as signed does not express the actual
judicial desire or intention of the court at all, but is contrary
thereto, the signing. of such purported judgment is a clerical
error r,ather than a judicial one.
The order is affirmed.
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having them under consideration for several weeks. No other
findings in the case were presented. He had before him
also a letter of protest from defendant's counsel charging
that they were, at least in part, "pure bunk." In his order
he stated that he intended to pronounce judgment in favor
of the defendants and the decision affirming it is placed, in
large measure, upon his declaration to that effect.
The recitals in an order of a trial judge that a judgment
was signed by him as a result of a clerical error are not conclusive upon an appellate court (Estate of Burnett, 11 Cal.·
(2d) 259 [79 Pac. (2d) 89]; Stevens v. Superior Oourt,
supra), and in the present case, the record is absolutely devoid of any evidence to support the statement that a clerical
error was made. On the contrary, there is ample support
for the conclusion that any error committed in giving judgment for the plaintiff was· a judicial one and subject to correction only upon timely motion for a new trial or by appeal.
Houser, J., concurred.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis,· J., and Traynor, J.,
concurred.
EDIVIONDS, J., Dissenting.-In failing to perceive that
the order appealed from was the correction of a judicial error
and not an alteration made necessary by inadvertence or misprision, the majority opinion, I believe, has departed from
the well established rule which compels a contrary determination. A court, so the rule declares, may correct clerical
errors or mistakes in its records and proceedings because
such correction does not change a judicial act previously
done, but is an alteration to make the record speak the
truth. It may also set aside judgments and orders made
prematurely, or through inadvertence, as this presents no
question of judicial review upon the merits. But it has no
power, once it has made a decision after regular submission
of the case, to set aside or amend for judicial error, especially
when the only reason for so doing is that the judge has come
to a conclusion contrary to that expressed by the earlier adjudication. (Stevens v. Superior Oourt, 7 Cal. (2d) 110 [59
Pac. (2d) 988], and cases cited; Harth v. Ten Eyck, 16 Cal.
(2d) 829 [108 Pac. (2d) 675], at p. 832.)
Here the evidence shows without contradiction that the
trial judge signed the findings of fact' and the judgment after

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
15, 1942. Edmonds, J., and Houser, J., voted for a rehearing.

[L. A. No. 16742.

In Bank. Dec. 19, 1941.]

HARRY G. VAN DENBURGH, as Administrator, etc.,
Appellant, . v. WALTER V. GOODFELLOW et al.,
Respondents.
[1] Bankruptcy-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected

-Debts not Duly Scheduled.-A debt is not duly scheduled
and is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy if the
bankrupt has listed the creditor's address incorrectly. (See
11 U. S. C. A., § 25 (8).)
[2] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts
not Duly Scheduled-Good Paith.-A debt is not duly scheduled and is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy where
the creditor's address is not correctly given, even though
McK. Dig. References: [1-3,5-9] Bankruptcy, § 38; [4,10]
Bankruptcy, § 12; [11] Executions, § 34; [12] Decedents' Estates,
§ 780.
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the error may have resulted from reliance upon a blurred
carbon copy of a complaint served upon the bankrupt. which
set forth the office address of plaintiff's attorney. Where
the correct address is easily obtainable, good faith in listing the debt is immaterial.
[3] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts
not Duly Scheduled-Notice to Creditor.-A debt not duly
scheduled is not discharged in bankruptcy where the creditor
did not receive notice of the proceeding within the time for
filing claims, it appearing that the notice mailed was undelivered because of an incorrect address. Publication of
notice of the prOoceedings in a newspaper is not sufficient
because the statute requires actual notice to be given creditors.
[4] Id.-Debts-Claims Provable-Time for-Extension.-A bankruptcy referee may in his discretion permit a creditor to file
a formal complaint after the six-month period has elapsed,
under the theory that the formal claim is merely an amendment to an informal claim made within the time limit.
[5] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Notice
to Creditor-Time for.-The notice to a creditor required by
Bankruptcy Act, § 35, must be given within the six-month
period allowed by the act for filing of claims.
[6] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts
not Duly Scheduled-Notice to Creditor-Equal Opportunity
With Creditors.-Under Bankruptcy Act, § 35, the creditor
must receive notice in time to enable him to take advantage
of the benefits of the Bankruptcy Law-in time to give him
an equal opportunity with other creditors. It may not come
so late as to deprive him of participation in the administration of the affairs of the estate.
[7a,7b] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not AffectedDebts not Duly Scheduled-Voluntary Participation, Effect
of.-Although the notice to a creditor may have been insufficient, voluntary participation in the bankruptcy proceeding
as the result of permission extended to file a claim after the
expiration of the six-month period, operates to discharge the
debt owed the creditor by the bankrupt. By electing to file
a claim, the creditor waives any rights arising from defects
in the schedule or notice or from any detriment he may suffer
because of having no opportunity to participate in the administration of the estate.
[8] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts
not Duly Scheduled-Notice to Creditor-Reason for Rule.

[3]

See 4 Cal. Jur. 87; 6 Am. Jur. 817.
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The prOVIsIons requiring either a correct statement of the
ereditor's address or actual notice to him are intended to insure the creditor an opportunity to participate in the administration of the bankrupt's estate and to share in the
assets.
[9] rd.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Participation as Affecting Codebtor.-The fact that a creditor
participated in a bankruptcy proceeding of one joint debtor
despite a defective notice does not discharge his codebtor ai:S
to whom a separate proceeding was instituted. The detailed
scheduling of the debt and the one bankrupt's testimony
thereof at the first creditors' meeting does not constitute a
sufficient claim in the other proceeding.
[10] Id.-Debts-Claims Provable-Time for-Extension-Duty
to Petition for Leave.-Information. supplied by a bankrupt
may be considered a claim only fOor the purpose of allowing
a petitioning creditor to file an amended claim after the
statutory period has expired, when equity and good conscience
require that he be permitted to participate in the bankruptcy
proceeding. _ The creditor is not required to petition for leave
to file such an amended claim.
[11] Executions-Relief Against---Quashing-Costs.-Since a mo··
tion to quash a writ of execution is a special proceeding (Code
Civ. Proc., § 23), costs must be allowed the prevailing party.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1032 (a).)
[12] Decedents' Estates-Actions-Costs.-Costs adjudged on a
proceeding to quash a writ of execution in an action by an
administrator are chargeable against the estate, and not the
administrator personally, where there is no claim of mismanagement or bad faith. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1026.)

APPEAl.J from· an order and judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County recalling a writ of execution,
directing release of property held under the writ, and enjoining the securing of a further writ or enforcing the judgment
against the defendants. Charles D. Ballard, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Oscar S. Elvrum and Girard F. Baker for Appellant.
Otto A. Gerth for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On August 15, 1935, plaintiff Harry G.
Van Denburgh, as administrator of the estate of Mrs. Ar-
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thur J. Clark, obtained a judgment against defendants
Walter V. Goodfellow and Elizabeth B. Goodfellow, upon a
note secured by a mortgage. On September 10, 1935, the
mortgaged premises were sold and a deficiency judgment was
entered against the defendants. On September 23, 1936,
the defendants filed separate petitions in bankruptcy in the
Federal District Court, and each was adjudicated a bankrupt.
They listed plaintiff's judgment in the schedule of debts
attached to each bankruptcy petition. Under the caption
"Creditors Whose Claims Are Unsecured" there was listed:
"Harry G. Van Denburgh, Admr. of Estate of Mrs. Arthur J. Clark, deficiency on foreclosure judgment and sale
. . . $20,000.00." The same indebtedness was also list~d in
each petition under the caption "Creditors Holding SMurities" as follows: "Mrs. Arthur J. Clark, deceased, ca)"e of
Harry G. Van Denburgh, 10] Title Guarantee Buil(ting,
Los Angeles . . . $26,000.00." Full information about the
indebtedness was given by defendants in their schedules as
well as at the first meeting of the creditors. Harry G. Van
Denburgh neither resided nor had an office at 1010 Title
Guarantee Building. His name and proper address appeared
in the Los Angeles telephone book and the city directory.
Van Denburgh's attorneys in the matter of the estate of
Mrs. Clark, whose names did not appear in defendant's schedules, had offices on the tenth floor of the Title Guarantee
Building in Los Angeles but not in room 1010. A copy CL
plaintiff's complaint, served upon defendants, gave the office
address of plaintiff's attorneys as 1019 Title Guarantee
Building, but defendants read this address as 1010 Title
Guarantee Building because the figures were blurred.
A referee was appointed by the bankruptcy court and the
first meeting' of creditors was held on October 13, 1936. Notice of this meeting was published in· the Los Angeles Daily
Journal, but the notices intended for plaintiff Van Denburgh
and mailed to the address given in the schedules were returned undelivered. In October, 1936, a clerk of the trustee
in bankruptcy telephoned the office of plaintiff's attorneys to
inquire about possible assets in their possession belonging to
the bankrupts' estates. The clerk, however, did not talk to
the attorneys; the person answering the telephone informed
him that the attorney for whom he asked was no longer associated with the office. Plaintiff received notice of defend-

°

ants' bankruptcy proceedings on April 8, 1937. On May 24,
1937, plaintiff petitioned the referee in the Walter V. Goodfellow bankruptcy proceeding for leave to file a claim based
on the deficiency judgment, and received permission to do
so. No claim was filed in the Elizabeth B. Goodfellow bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff shared in the subsequent dis'tribution of Walter V. Goodfellow's assets.
On May 3, 1937, plaintiff secured a writ of execution and
levied upon property of Walter V. Goodfellow. Defendants
thereupon moved to quash the execution· and to restrain future executions upon the ground they were released from the
indebtedness to plaintiff by t~e adjudications of bankruptcy.
After each defendant had received a final discharge in bankruptcy on June 7, 1937, the superior court held a hearing,
entered an order granting the motion, and gave judgment
quashing the execution, enjoining plaintiff from securing
any further writs of execution or attempting to enforce the
judgment against defendants, and awarding costs to defendants. The trial court found that defendants had no intent to deceive the plaintiff and that "the plaintiff's name,
claims and demands and description thereof, together with
his address were properly and duly given and set forth by
each of the defendants herein in their bankruptcy schedules
... and that the plaintiff received actual notice of the filing
of said bankruptcy petition and the pendency thereof of
each of the defendants herein within the time prescribed by
law for creditors to present and file their claims. . . . "
Plaintiff has appealed from the order and judgment, contending that the debt was not discharged by the bankruptcy
proceedings because it was not properly listed by the defendants in their bankruptcy schedules and because he did not
receive notice of such proceedings within the time prescribed
by the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 25(8) (11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 25 (8)) of the Bankruptcy Act requires a voluntary bankrupt to file with his
petition "a list of his creditors, showing their residences,
if known, if unknown, that fact to be stated." The penalty
for failure to schedule a debt properly is stated in section
35 of the act: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a
bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . .
have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt,
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unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
proceedings in bankruptcy . . . "
[1] It is well settled that a debt is not duly scheduled if
the bankrupt has listed the creditor's address incorrectly.
(See cases cited under 11 U. S. O. A., sec. 25, note 23; Brown
v. Tropp, 106 Cal. App. 605 [289 Pac. 648]; Parker v.
Murphy, 215 Mass. 72 [102 N. E. 85, 87] ; In Re D'Alessio,
24 Fed. Supp. 563.) "The bankrupt is under duty to use
reasonable diligence to ascertain the residence of the creditor,
and if thereby he acquires knowledge of such residence he
must state it correctly, and if he fails to ascertain such residence, to state that the residence is unknown. It is ... implicit in a schedule which fails to state that the creditor's
residence is unknown, that the bankrupt (after reasonably
diligent inquiry, if necessary) knows such residence and has
truly stated same."
(McGehee v. Brookins (Tex. Oiv. App.),
140 S. W. (2d) 963, 964.)
[2] In the present case there is no evidence to support
the finding of the trial court that plaintiff's address was
properly set forth in defendants' bankruptcy schedules. The
evidence establishes without contradiction that 1010 Title
Guarantee Building was not the address of plaintiff, or of
the estate of Mrs. Olark; or of plaintiff's attorneys. Since
defendants could easily have determined plaintiff's correct
address, their good faith in listing the debt is immaterial.
(See Fible v. Orabb, 129 Ky. 461 [112 S. W. 576].)
[3] There is likewise no evidence to support the finding
of the trial court that plaintiff received notice of the bankruptcy proceedings within the time prescribed by law for
the filing of claims. Under the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act in force at that time a creditor's claim could not be allowed unless it was filed within six months after the date on
which the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt. (44 Stats.
(part 2) 666, c. 406, sec. 13.) The evidence shows that plaintiff received no notice of the bankruptcy proceedings until
April 8, 1937, more than six months after September 23,
1936, when defendants were adjudicated bankrupts. The
notices mailed to the plaintiff by the referee were returned
undelivered. No information was communicated to plaintiff
or his attorneys by virtue of the telephone call of the trustee's
clerk. Publication of a notice of the proceedings in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal was not sufficient because the act
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requires that actual notice be given to creditors. (Santa
Rosa Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703, 705 [73 Pac. 577] ; Ragsdale v. Bothman, 81 Mont. 408 '[263 Pac. 972] ; Strickland
v. Oapital Oity Mills, 74 S. O. 16 [54 S. E. 220, 7L. R. A.
(N. S.) 426] ; Lynch v. McKee (Tex. Civ. App.), 214 S. W.
484; Interstate Oredit League v. Widdison, 50 Ida. 493 [297
Pac. 1106].) .
[4] A bankruptcy referee, however, may in his discretion
permit a creditor to file a formal claim after the six-month
period has elapsed, under the theory that the formal claim
is merely an amendment to an informal claim made within
the time limit. (In re Lipman, 65 Fed. (2d) 366; In re
Pant, 21 Fed. (2d) 182; Scottsville National Bank v. Gilmer,
37 Fed. (2d) 227.) [5] Defendants contend, therefore,
that the notice to plaintiff on April 8, 1937, was within the
time prescribed by law for the filing of claims, since plaintiff was permitted to file his formal claim in the Walter V.
Goodfellow bankruptcy proceeding more than six: months
after the adjudication. It is established, however, that the
notice required by the Bankruptcy Act must be given within
the six-month period allowed by the act for the filing of
claims. (Industrial Loan & Investment 00. v. Ohapman
(La. App.), 193 So. 504; Bell v. Georgia Ohemical Works}
33 Ga. App. 286 [125 S. E. 871]; Morganstern v. Tulchin,
]40 Misc. 44 [250 N. Y. Supp. 498] ; In re :weUe, 12 Fed.
Supp. 612; Hunter v. Hall, 60 Ga. App. 493 [4 S. E. (2d)
69] ; see In re Feldesman, 13 Fed. Supp. 1010; In re R. B.
Rose 00., 43 Fed. (2d) 446; Brown v.· Tropp, supra.)
[6] Moreover, the creditor must receive such notice in time
to enable him to take advantage of the benefits of the Bankruptcy Law "in time to give him an equal opportunity with
other creditors." It may not come so late "as to deprive
him of participation in the administration of the affairs of
the estate. . . . " (Birkett v. Oolumbia Bank, 195 U. S.
345 [25 Sup. Ct. 38, 49 L. Ed. 231] ; Brown v. Tropp) supra;
Reynolds v. Whittemore, 99 Me. 108 [58 Atl. 415].) The
creditor's right to participate in the administration of the
affairs of the estate, including the right to vote for the trustee, cannot be disregarded on the theory that such participation would have made no difference. (Brown v. Tropp,
supra.)
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Clearly the defendants did not properly state plaintiff's
address in their bankruptcy schedules nor did plaintiff receive notice in time to render the error of no consequence~
In the absence of further action on plaintiff's part, the discharge of each defendant in bankruptcy would not release
his debt.
[7a] In the Walter V. Goodfellow proceeding the referee
permitted the plaintiff to file a formal claim, after the expiration of the six-month period, on the theory that it was
an amendment to the claim shown to exist by the schedules
of the bankrupt and his testimony at the first meeting of
the creditors. On the basis of this claim the plaintiff shared
in the bankrupt's estate. This voluntary participation by
plaintiff in the. bankruptcy proceeding operates to discharge
the debt owed him by the bankrupt, despite the incorrect
address and' the late notice. It is true that certain types
of debts for reasons of public policy, cannot be discharged
by bankruptcy proceedings, and a creditor who files a claim
and shares in the assets is not barred from subsequently enforcing the unsatisfied portion of the debt. (Friend v . .Talcott, 228 U. S. 27 [33 Sup. Ct. 505, 57 L. Ed. 718] ; Allard
v. La Plain, 147 Wash. 497 [266 Pac. 688]. See Meyer v.
Price, 250 N. Y. 370 [165 N. E. 814].) Such debts, listed
in section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act, include liabilities for
obtaining property by false pretenses or misrepresentations,
for wilful and malicious injuries to person or property, for
alimony or maintenance of wife or child, for seduction, for
fraud, embezzlement, or misappropriation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity, and taxes. A debt that is not discharged
only because it is improperly scheduled, however, does not
fall into this category for there is nothing in the nature of
such a debt that requires a denial of discharge. (See In
re Baker, 275 Fed. 511, 512.) [8] The provisions requiring
either a correct statement of the creditor's address or actual
notice to him are intended to insure the creditor an opportunity to participate in the administration of the bankrupt's
estate and to share in the assets. [7b] A creditor who refrains from making a claim against the bankrupt when these
provisions are violated does not share in the assets of the es. tate but retains his debt unimpaired. If, on the contrary, he
elects to file a claim with the permission of the referee: he
waives any rights arising from defects in the schedule or
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notice or from any detriment he may suffer because of having
no opportunity to participate in the administration of the
estate and receives in return the right to share in the distribution of assets. The principal right of a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, to which all other rights are incidental,
is sharing in the assets. If a .creditor such as the plaintiff
in the present case elects to share in the assets, there is rio
reason why his debt should not be discharged.
[9] Plaintiff, however, did not file a claim in the Elizabeth B. Goodfellow bankruptcy proceeding and the debtor
there remains liable on the debt. That liability is in no
way altered by plaintiff's claim in the Walter V. Goodfell ow
proceeding. The two proceedings were separate and the discharge of Walter V. Goodfellow did not· discharge his codebtor. (Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 34; "Wilcox
v. Hersch, 43 R. 1. 81 [110 Atl. 409]; Barnes v. Silveus,
114 Pa. Super. 214 [173 Atl. 837] ; In re Quackenb'UJsh, 106
N. Y. Supp. 773. See cases cited in 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 34,
. notes 21, 22.) Defendants contend that if the detailed scheduling of plaintiff's debt and the bankrupt's extensive testimony thereon at the first creditors' meeting constituted a
claim in the Walter V. Goodfellow proceeding, they must
also constitute a sufficient claim in the Elizabeth B. Goodfello·w bankruptcy proceeding. This contention fails to take
account of the requirement in the Bankruptcy Act that the
creditor must make proof of his claim. (11 U. S. C. A.,
sec. 93.) [10] Information supplied by a bankrupt may be
considered a claim only for the purpose of allowing a petitioning creditor to file an amended claim after the statutory
period has expired, when equity and good 'conscience require
that he be permitted to participate in the bankrupt'cy proceed.,.
ings. There is nothing in the Bankruptcy Act that requires
the creditor to petition for leave to file such an amended
claim. (Brown v. Tropp, supra; Birkett v. Columbia Bank,
supr~.)

[11] Since the motion by defendants to quash the execution is a special proceeding (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 23; Murphy
v. Davids, 55 Cal. App. 416, 420, 421 [203 Pac. 802]; see
In re Sutter Butte By-Pass Assessment, 190 Cal. 532, 537
[213 Pac. 974]), costs must be allowed the prevailing party.
(Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1032 (a).) Defendants contend that
the costs awarded them by the trial court were chargeable
19

c.
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against plaintiff personally, and are not reviewable on appeal
because plaintiff personally has not appealed. [12] There
is no charge of mismanagement or bad faith on the part of
plaintiff, however, so costs are chargeable against the estate of
Mrs. Clark, not against plaintiff personally, and the judgment should so state. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1026; Sterling
v. Gregory, 149 Cal. 117,121,122 [85 Pac. 305].)
The order and judgment are affirmed insofar as they apply
to Walter V. Goodfellow, and are reversed insofar as they
apply to Elizabeth B. Goodfellow.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Carter, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 17495. In Bank. Dec. 22, 1941.]
HOWARD W. BLACKBURN, Appellant, v. HOME LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK (a Corporation) , Respondent.
[1] Insurance-Contract - Interpretation-Against Insurer .-Because contracts of insurance are generally drawn by the insurer, any uncertainties or ambiguities therein are resolved
most strongly in favor of the insured.
[2] Id.-Contract-Interpretation-Application of General Rules.
Where there is no ambiguity in a contract of insurance, courts
will indulge in no forced construction againt the insul'er,
and the policy, like any other contract, is to be interpreted
according to the intention of the parties as expressed in the
instrument in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
[3] Id.-Contract - Interpretation - Indorsements and RidersSingle Contract.-Where a life insurance policy, with an attached rider covering disability benefits, was issued pursuant
to a single application for a policy of life insurance "with"
disability benefits, where it describes itself as one policy, and
where the rider standing alone is incomplete and meaning-

[1]
[2]

See 14 Cal. Jur. 443-445; 29 Am. Jur. 166.
See 14 Cal. Jur. 446; 29 Am. Jur. 172.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Insurance, § 60; [2] Insurance,
§ 56; [3-5] Insurance, § 67.
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less, the policy and its rider constitute a single unified
contract.
[4] Id.-Contract - Interpretation - Indorsements and RidersSeparate Contract-Title.-The controlling effect of decisions
determining to be single contracts policies with attached riders
entitled "Supplementary Agreement made a part of the Policy," is not avoided by the change of the title to read, contract
"issued in connection with and attached to Policy," especially where the law of the place of contract expressly
provides that rider forms shall be deemed to be parts of
policies.
[5] Id.-Cont1;act - Interpretation - Indorsements and RidersSeparate Contract-Particular Circumstances.-In determining whether a rider providing for disability benefits constitutes a contract separate from the policy to which it is
attached,controlling significance is not to be attached to the
fact that it was separately executed, that its premium is
separately stated and not combined with that of the policy,
or that the benefits provideq. for may be discontinued by the
policy holder without terminating the benefit provisions of the
policy.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Minor l\{oore, Judge. Affirmed.
Representative action by holder of policy of mutual insurance company for an accounting, for judgment for dividends
claimed to be due policyholders, and a declaration of the
rights of the respective parties. Judgment for defendant
affirmed.
Arthur Rosenblum and -Fred Horowitz for Appellant
Loeb & Loeb, Herman F. Selvin and William Marshall
Bullitt for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-The allegations of the appellant's com.plaint include the statement that he is suing on behalf of
himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated holding
policies issued by the respondent which provide for payment
upon death and also for permanent disability benefits. He
charges that the respondent has been guilty of unlawful discrimination by calculating and allowing dividends Upon such
policies at a lower rate than upon those which do not include
disability benefits. Because of the respondent's practice in

